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Abstract
We investigate techniques for reducing the memory requirements of a model 
checking tool employing explicit enumeration. Two techniques are studied in 
depth: (1) exploiting symmetries in the model, and (2) exploiting sequential 
regions in the model. The first technique resulted in a significant reduction in 
memory requirements at the expense of an increase in run time. It is capable 
of finding progress violations at much lower stack depths. In addition, it is 
more general than two previously published methods to exploit symmetries, 
namely scalar sets and network invariants. The second technique comes 
with no time overheads and can effect significant memory usage reductions 
directly related to the amount of sequentiality in the model. Both techniques 
have been implemented as part of the SPIN verifier.
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A b strac t
We investigate techniques for reducing the memory requirements of a model checking tool 
employing explicit enumeration. Two techniques are studied in depth: (1) exploiting symmetries 
in the model, and (2) exploiting sequential regions in the model. The first technique resulted 
in a significant reduction in memory requirements at the expense of an increase in run time. 
It is capable of finding progress violations at much lower stack depths. In addition, it is more 
general than two previously published methods to exploit symmetries, namely scalar sets and 
network invariants. The second technique comes with no time overheads and can effect signif­
icant memory usage reductions directly related to the amount of sequentiality in the model. 
Both techniques have been implemented as part of the SPIN verifier.
K eyw ords: Formal Methods, Verification, Model Checking
1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
With the growing complexity of hardware and software, the need to formally verify them is 
being increasingly felt. Among the options available today, two of the prominent ones are 
based on deduction and model-checking [8]. Although both methods have their proponents, 
model-checking [3] is preferred when a relatively high degree of automation is desired, and when 
one-of-a-kind reactive behaviors are involved. Model-checking can be carried out either via 
im plicit enumeration where the state graph is implicitly traversed using (for example) BDD- 
methods or via explicit enumeration where the state graph is explicitly traversed and processed 
using graph algorithms. Both these approaches have their own strengths. Also, both methods 
suffer from state explosion [16], combating which forms a central research problem. This paper 
is about combating state explosion in explicit-enumeration-based verification.
S p ace/T im e  Tradeoffs D uring  Explicit E num era tion
Explicit enumeration forms the basis for a number of tools that have been used with great success 
in validating several real-life protocols [12, 10, 11]. One problem with explicit enumeration is 
that the available amount of memory often decides the size of the problem that can be handled; 
most explicit-enumeration-based tools give 100% “coverage” till this limit is reached, and give 
0% coverage once this limit is exceeded. Designers combat this abrupt loss of coverage in several 
ways; almost always, they use techniques such as throwing away irrelevant states, reducing the 
dimensions of the arrays involved, etc. [12]. Although this is essential in any verification
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approach, there are cases where even after problem-size reductions the number of states exceed 
the available amount of memory.
Most tools in this area “prefer time over space”— i.e., given a choice between running out 
of memory and giving slower responses, they prefer the latter. A justification for this attitude 
is that verification “jobs” can (and are) often run as background jobs, and designers are often 
willing to patiently wait for these jobs to come back with their answers, provided (according to 
their experience), their patience will (almost always) be rewarded. These ideas are key to our 
approach.
P ro m e la /S P IN , S u p ertrace , and Two S tate-space Search '
A simple and yet powerful method for effecting this “space/time tradeoff’ is used in an explicit- 
enumeration-based tool called SPIN [11], Strictly speaking, SPIN employs two techniques for 
effecting the space/time tradeoff: (1) supertrace, in which a “randomized” pruning of the state 
graph is effected; (2) two state-space method, in which only the amount of stack growth gen­
erated during a normal recursive depth-first search needs to be saved1. The experience of the 
SPIN user-community (including us) tells that these methods work well in practice, and can 
scale up to large problem sizes. In addition, descriptions of the system to be verified using SPIN 
can be provided in a high-level programming language called Promela. Promela is based on 
an asynchronous computational model which embodies powerful sequential and concurrent pro­
gramming constructs that help the designer translate his/her thoughts about the protocols being 
verified into Promela with minimal semantic distance. For these reasons, the work reported in 
this paper is about enhancing the performance of the Promela/SPIN system.
Even with the use of supertrace and the two state-space method, SPIN suffers from state 
explosion, mainly due to the sheer complexity that real-life systems have. There are two main 
reasons for state explosion: interleaved concurrent execution, and the size of the data-state 
space. In this paper, we are mainly concerned with the latter. Our research in this direction 
was motivated by the fact that we are currently faced with the problem of verifying a large 
distributed memory multiprocessor in which multiple identical components exist at all levels. 
It is essential that we capitalize on the existence of these sym m etries and avoid enumerating 
identical states repetitiously. The importance of exploiting symmetries is a widely studied 
problem, and is described in the next section.
C om paring  M ethods for Exploiting S ym m etries
There are many techniques available for exploiting symmetries. Three prominent categories of 
methods are (1) scalar sets [13], (2) homomorphic reductions [15], and (3) network invariants
^  . .  . . .In the scalar-set method, a non-traditional data type (actually a non-traditional family of
data types) called the scalar set is employed. A scalar set is a set with a finite and fixed number 
of elements. The elements of a scalar set, essentially, support only four operations: (1) equality 
testing, (2) inequality testing, (3) for-all, and (4) there-exists. As an example of usage of a 
scalar-set, consider an array A  whose elements are treated identically by the protocol being 
verified. One would then index A  using an index variable of type scalar-set. One would then 
only be able to test whether two index variables are the same or not, and either step through 
all the array locations using for-all or choose an arbitrary array index using there-exists. This 
information can be used by the verification tool to cut down the state space explored. In [13], 
it has been shown that scalar-sets are very useful in practice.
Another method for exploiting symmetries employed in tools such as COSPAN [10] is that of 
homomorphic reductions. In one instance of this approach, the system being verified is simplified 
by examining its sub-component(s), identifying those that are subject to state explosion, and 
replacing them by simplified sub-components that are equivalent with respect to the properties 
being verified.
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The network invariant method is a family of methods concerned with proving properties 
about arbitrarily sized networks. In one approach of this type [16], a network PI I . . .  of processes 
is represented by a more general description of the form P I I Q where Q represents a network of 
an arbitrary number of P’s. If a process such as Q (called the “network invariant”) can be found, 
the task of verification is greatly simplified. In another approach, a network of the form PI I . . . 
is replaced by an equivalent network of the form PN . The existence of a network invariant has 
been widely studied [1, 16]. In yet another approach [2], given a finite-state model, a quotient 
model that takes the symmetries in the problem into account is found, and used as the basis for 
model checking.
A drawback of scalar-sets that we have identified is that there are some situations which call 
for more than the four operations supported by scalar-set data objects. In the second example 
used in this paper, that of the Rollback Chip described in Section 4, the so called written bits 
(WB) array is indexed by two counters (called CMF and OMF) that are incremented in a 
modulo fashion. It is the jo in t behavior of WB, CMF, and OMF that reveals symmetries. As 
an example, the state (CMF=0,OMF=0,W B=“ones-only-at-position-0”) happens to be the same 
as the state (C M F=l,O M F=l,W B =“ones-only-at-position-l”) because both these situations are 
observationally equivalent as far as the RBC operations are concerned. If CMF and OMF were 
implemented as variables of type scalar-set, they cannot be used to index WB and at the same 
time be subject to modulo-increment operations which are carried out on them in the RBC 
design. Such symmetries are closer in spirit to the notion of representation invariants captured 
in works such as [9]. In this paper, we present our technique called state normalization for 
exploiting symmetries at this level.
The homomorphic reduction approach is more general than the method we propose, but not 
as direct and simple to apply. Although network invariants methods are elegant and some of 
the results in this area are quite powerful [4], these methods have, hitherto, been demonstrated 
only for simple classes of behaviors. For systems of the size and complexity we are interested 
in tackling, it is not clear how difficult it will be to find suitable network invariants or quotient 
models.
O ur C o n tribu tion : S ta te  N orm alization
In this paper, our contribution is a simple method called state normalization. In this method, 
the designer identifies the symmetries in the system manually, and expresses them as rewrite 
rules on system states. Then, when the SPIN verifier runs, these rewrite rules are repeatedly 
invoked on each new state generated until a normal form  system-state is obtained2 The search 
continues with respect to normal form states, and all un-normalized states are discarded. Our 
results show that the method introduces only a low overall time overhead and effects a dramatic 
reduction in the number of states generated.
We have implemented state normalization as an extension to the SPIN verifier. We report 
experimental results obtained in the context of two non-trivial examples. The first example is 
concerned with distributed locking and was manually derived from an actual C /C +-1- implemen­
tation being developed by the systems group in our Department. Section 3 introduces state 
normalization with the help of this example.
The second example is concerned with verifying the Rollback Chip which was developed by 
our group several years ago [7] and is an IFIP WG 10.5 benchmark contributed by the second 
author. A functional/equational manual proof of correctness has been completed for the RBC [7].
Our present exercise of re-describing RBC in a reactive system description language is consistent 
with the manner in which system design refinement happens in formal design approaches: an 
initial functional description is gradually transformed into a more reactive version that embodies 
scheduling- and resource-related details. (See [6] for a case study of functional derivation followed 
by reactive process derivation.) The RBC example is detailed in Section 4.
2This rewriting process always terminates; depending on efficiency considerations, the designer may not always 
want to attain unique normal forms.
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Because of the emphasis on implementation efficiency, the SPIN verifier compiles each 
Promela specification annotated with verification assertions into C-code and runs this C-code, 
rather than interpret Promela directly. In our current prototype, the state normalization proce­
dures are coded in C and included with the above C-code. Writing normalization procedures in 
the C language is an error-prone activity; hence, we have come up with a scheme to automate 
this process, which is described in Section 5.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An overview of SPIN, the two state-space 
method, and supertrace is provided in Section 2. This is followed by a detailed look at state 
normalization via two examples (Sections 3 and 4). The normalizer is detailed in Section 5. 
Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6 .
A n  O v e r v i e w  o f  S P I N
SUPERTRACE
Hashing can alias states 
thereby rendering DFS partial
A : Accept labels 
P : Progress labels
A stack is 
kept tor 
effecting DFS
EXAMPLE ILLUSTRATING TWO STATE-SPACE METHOD
2*24-1
Figure 1: Overview of SPIN and Supertrace
Figure 1 provides an overview of supertrace. An automaton representing the joint execution of all 
the components of the concurrent system being verified is generated through the asynchronous 
product operator. An example of a product automaton is given in Figure 1. The graph of this 
automaton is elaborated depth-first. The size of the automaton graph is cut down via pruning 
which is achieved as follows. Each new state generated is hashed into the index-space of a one 
dimensional bit-array called the “bit-bucket” hash-table, H. Suppose the current state is S, and 
has successors 5,- —  Supertrace computes the index k at which Si falls, and if H[k] is already 
set, it is assumed that Si has already been visited; the search then continues with 5',-+i. On the 
other hand, if H[k] is not set, the depth-first elaboration is continued at 5,-. A “randomized” 
pruning of the state-space naturally occurs through hash collisions. For small problem sizes, a 
regular hash table with linked-list buckets can be employed, which will then give full coverage. 
SPIN supports this option also; one could view full-search as an extreme case of supertrace 
(amount of pruning equals zero).
SPIN supports four basic kinds of checks: local (state) assertions, deadlocks, progress loops,
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and accept cycles. State assertions establish safety properties. Any number of assertions can be 
placed in the user’s Promela code, and these will be checked when control reaches that state. 
Deadlocks are automatically detected and reported by SPIN when a state without a successor 
is generated. Progress loops are loops in the state graph indicated by labels that begin with 
keyword progress (shown as “P” in the figure). For a system to be free from livelocks, its 
execution must be confined to one of its progress loops. Accept loops are opposite in sense: 
executions traversing an accept loop are considered “bad”. They correspond to the acceptance 
condition of a Biichi automaton that captures an undesirable infinitary execution (for instance, 
unfair selection). Stack-growth during supertrace depends on the length of an execution path 
before a state is deemed to have been revisited by supertrace.
Checking for progress loops and accept cycles by building the entire state-graph is highly 
memory intensive. SPIN avoids this complexity by using the two state-space method, an example 
illustrating which appears to the right of Figure 1. Suppose we would like to detect and report 
the non-progress loop F, B, C, D, E, F (state “P” indicates the progress loop). A naive algorithm 
to detect non-progress loops during the depth-first search phase proves to be very inadequate
[11]. SPIN uses modified depth-first search which works as follows on our example: when state 
B is revisited, it builds the subgraph rooted at the state immediately prior to the revisited state 
(state F in our example) in its entirety, in “the heap”. In our example, let us say that depth-first 
search generated A, B, C, D, E, F, and B. At this point, the first path to be built in the heap 
is F, B, P. This path is abandoned because it includes the progress label “P”. The next path 
built in the heap is F, B, C, D, E, F, and this path is reported as being a non-progress loop.
Thus, instead of building the entire state-graph, the two state-space method needs to, at 
a time, build only the amount of state contained in the depth-first stack plus a piece of the 
state graph rooted at the revisit-point. State normalization is aimed at reducing the size of 
the depth-first search stack and the number of entries (including collisions) made into the hash 
table.
3  S t a t e  N o r m a l i z a t i o n  I l l u s t r a t e d  o n  a  L o c k i n g  P r o t o c o l
The basic idea behind state normalization is extremely simple: (1) manually identify states 
that are equivalent, (2) select one of the states as the normal form, and (3) whenever a state 
is generated during depth-first search, normalize it if it is not already so. Note that if an
Figure 2: A Caveat During Normalization
unnormalized state is generated as part of the regular depth first search, it is not acceptable 
to just ignore that state and continue the search, hoping that the normalized form of the same 
state will be eventually generated. This is explained with aid of an example in Figure 2 where
I is the initial state, state N1 is the normalized form of the state U l, N2 is the normalized form
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of state U2, and N3 is the normalized form of the state U3. If the the un-normalized states 
are just discarded, then U1 will be discarded, and hence N2 will never be generated. N l, an 
equivalent state of U l, will be generated, and explored. However U2, the successor of N l, is also 
discarded because U2 is not a normal form. Thus the search never visits N3 or its equivalent 
form U3. Hence, whenever an un-normalized state is generated, it is necessary to normalize it 
and pursue it, rather than discard it rightaway.
Equivalences among states are induced by the symmetries in the system being verified. It is 
standard practice to require the designer to identify the symmetries in a system [12, 10, 2], Most 
of the symmetries in concurrent systems are self-evident {e.g., Figure 3). This processor topology
Figure 3: The Multiprocessor Supporting the Locking Protocol
is typical of many concurrent protocols. The global state of such a system is a tuple of the states 
of the individual processing nodes plus the state of the medium (or “bus”). Any specific state 
that arises can always be normalized by taking processor 1 (for example) as the reference point. 
For example, in a truly symmetric system, the situation of processor 2 having sent a request to 
processor 3 and expecting a response from it can be rewritten into an equivalent situation with 
processor 1 playing the role of processor 2, and processor 2 playing the role of processor 3. We 
now proceed to present the details of the locking protocol and the state normalization function 
used.
3.1 D eta ils  o f th e  L ocking P ro to co l 
Acquire
po==m e  
locked < - 1
po <>  me 
send req(po.me)
recv granted(Q) 
queue <- Q  
locked <- 1
queue == /i.\1
send grantedft) to h 
locked <- 0 
po <- h




po <>  me
send req(po,x)
po == m e A locked == 0  
po < - x
recv req(me,x) 
send granted({}) to x
recv req(me,x) 
append x  to queue
Figure 4: State Machine Describing the Locking Protocol
A system of N processors communicate by sending message through a medium. The processors 
coordinate among themselves to gain access to a shared resource protected by means of a lock.
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Every processor maintains “probable owner”; a variable pointing to the processor (possibly 
itself) which in its view is owning the lock (variable po of Figure 4). The lock is said to be 
owned by a processor if and only if the probable owner is itself. The lock itself can be in one 
of the two possible states at the owner: available or held. In Figure 4, states labeled C are 
part of the critical section implemented by the locking protocol while those labeled NC and 
W are outside this critical section. When processor p  wants access to this critical section, it 
will execute the Acquire process which first checks whether the lock is currently owned by p 
(the check “po = =  me”). If it is, then the lock is set to “held” (locked <— 1), and the critical 
section is accessed. If p  is not the current owner, a request for the lock is sent to the probable 
owner, and p  then waits in state W for a granted message. When a request message is received 
by processor q, its Handle process is executed. This process checks to see if processor q is the 
owner of the lock. If it is not, then the message is forwarded to whom processor q thinks to be 
the probable owner. Otherwise, if the lock is currently in the held state (locked = =  1), then the 
request is enqueued into the queue maintained by processor q. On the other hand, if the lock is 
in the available state (locked = =  0), a granted message is sent to the requester (p) along with 
the current queue which is empty ({>; it is an error to find locked = =  0 and the current queue 
non-empty).
When the lock is released by the Acquire process, the queue is inspected to see if there are 
any enqueued requests for the lock. If there are none, the lock is set to the available state. If 
there are pending requests, a granted message is sent to the processor whose identity is at the 
head of the queue (h). This message also carries the rest of the queue (t). The probable owner 
is set to h and the locked status is cleared.
Each process in the state machine of Figure 4 is coded as one proctype in Promela. The 
communication medium is modeled as a collection of ports, one port per process. The ports are 
order-preserving, and their sizes are picked so as to make all send operations non-blocking. The 
queues (called “queue” in Figure 4) are modeled as chan data type. Since a transition of an 
acquire process can’t be taken simultaneously with a transition of a handle process on the same 
node, the two processes co-ordinate by using a semaphore called ‘mutex’. (Semaphore ‘mutex’ 
is different from the variable ‘locked’, since mutex is a regular semaphore on a uniprocessor, 
while variable ‘locked’ is distributed on multiple nodes. Also, to achieve the atomicity needed 
to implement the test-and-set of ‘mutex’, the atomic construct of Promela is used.)
3.2 P ro p er tie s  C hecked and R esu lts
The following properties were established:
1. At most one process is in the critical section implemented by the protocol (i.e., in state 
C) at any given time.
2. The protocol is deadlock-free.
We also tried to establish global progress, defined as the ability of at least one of the processors 
to be eventually in state C starting from any point in time. SPIN reported that global progress 
was not being met, and gave the error trace shown in Figure 5.
The following table summarizes the performance of state normalization (N) relative to un­
normalized executions (U). “Depth reached” was the stack depth-bound set for each SPIN run, 
“nStates” was the total number of states visited, and “Time” was the elapsed time reported by 
the Unix command tim e, in seconds.






















Processor PO is the current owner of the lock, and Processor P I  and Processor P2 point to P 0 through their 
probable-owner variable. At this time, the medium, and all the queues are empty.
1. P I sends a request to P 0 for the lock.
2. Upon receipt of this request, PO sends a granted message to P I. In addition, it sets its probable-owner variable 
to P I. (At this point, there is a temporary cycle in the probable-owner chain between  PO and P I . Though 
this cycle is meant to vanish, it m ay not always, as we will see shortly.)
3. Concurrently P 2 also sends a request to PO.
4. PO receives this request from P 2 and forwards it to P I, given that PO’s probable-owner variable is set to P I.
5. P i ’s Handle process acts on the request forwarded by PO before P i ’s Acquire process can act on the granted 
message sent in step 2. This causes the Acquire process to block.
6. The handle process of P I  continues to run, and forwards the request message from P 2 to PO, since P i ’s 
probable owner is still pointing to PO.
7. PO forwards the message again to P i ,  which again interferes with the reception of granted message at P I  (just 
as it did in step 5). This process repeats. (Had the granted message been serviced, the probable-owner cycle 
would have vanished.)
Figure 5: Error Trace
For Progress properties, both methods visited the same number of states before finding the 
error. The un-normalized execution time is always lesser than the normalized execution time 
which is to be expected in any method that tries to trade-off time for space. Also, upon deeper 
examination, it was found that the process of normalizing a state (details given in Section 5) 
itself consumed about 89% of the total execution time. Techniques to reduce the time taken to 
normalize states need to be investigated.
It is worth noting that normalization can help detect progress violations at much lower search 
depths. This is due to the fact that with normalization, the depth-first search procedure used 
by SPIN does not stack equivalent states.
4  S t a t e  S a v i n g  b y  E x p l o i t i n g  S e q u e n t i a l i t y
We now illustrate our second state-saving technique on a different category which applies to 
systems that are fairly deterministic in nature, and are typically derived from a procedu­
ral/functional description. Examples of this category are data-intensive modules such as mem­
ory management units, various tabular data structures, and the like. In particular, we pick 
an example called the Rollback Chip for which we have, in our prior work, come up with a 
functional/equational specification and verified correctness using verification conditions gener­
ated from a computational induction scheme [7]. Our asynchronous synthesis group is currently 
actively engaged in trying to reimplement the RBC by detailing its operations to include more 
scheduling and resource sharing information. In a formal sense, this is a process of conducting 
design refinements [14] in a functional framework, and leading through a process/reactive frame­
work. (An example of our past work in this area in deriving a pipelined multiplier is reported 
in [6].)
4.1 O verview  o f th e  R B C  Sp ecification
RBC [5] is a simple memory management unit designed to speed up the process of state saving 
and rollback in distributed discrete event based simulation using Time Warp. For the purpose 
of this paper, its functionality can be understood as follows. The RBC behaves like an abstract 
data type object with interface operations reset to initialize the RBC, mark and rollback to 
change the address mapping function, and read to map a given logical address to a physical
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address. All these operations have a purely functional description given in [7], where a proof 
of correctness (using equational reasoning) of the refinement of the RBC architecture has been 
reported. The Promela version of the RBC system was arrived at by modeling each RBC 
operation through a proctype. Invoking an operation is achieved by a message to the process 
associated with the operation, and waiting for a reply from the process.
Symmetries in this example cannot be exploited using scalarsets for reasons explained on 
Page 3. However, our normalization technique does work, as it is based on explicitly normalizing 
states. We do not elaborate upon state normalization in the context of the RBC example, as it 
has already been illustrated on the locking protocol. Instead, in this section, we look at another 
method to cut down memory requirements which is based on exploiting purely sequential regions 
of the RBC operations.
4.2 R esu lts  ,
Despite scaling the problem size down, the RBC model couldn’t be completely verified due 
to the high number of reachable states. One problem identified was that the SPIN run time 
system was saving state after executing each statement of a process. However, this state saving 
is necessary only if there are multiple enabled threads in an execution. In case of the RBC, 
however, only one thread is enabled at any given time. (This was because the Promela version 
was a direct translation of the functional description given in [7]. Successive refinements of this 
Promela version will have much more concurrency; however, in these versions also there would 
be occasional sequential regions.) This fact can be exploited by not saving states in-between 
the individual steps contained in a sequential region. This resulted in a sixfold reduction in 
memory requirements. More specifically, the unoptimized version needed a depth of 350 just to 
visit every single statement of the protocol while the optimized version could achieve the same 
effect with a depth of only 55. A total of 18646 states were stored in the optimized version, 
while a total of 97947 states were stored in case of the unoptimized version. With a hash table 
of size 218, the former produced only 641 collisions, while the later produced 60,973 collisions.
5  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  N o r m a l i z e r
We now describe details of the normalizer with respect to the locking protocol. This protocol is 
symmetric with respect to the processor IDs. However, because of interdependencies between 
the processors through their “probable owner” variables, the normalizer is somewhat involved. 
These dependencies also extend through the message queues and other data structures.
A simplified version of the normalizer is shown in Figure 6. In this figure, LESS-THAN 
corresponds to an arbitrary partial order chosen by the user with respect to which the normal­
izations are performed. Function normalize “sorts” the positions of the processors in the state 
vector according to the partial order LESS-THAN. Whenever the partial order is violated, the 
normalizer exchanges the processors involved. It first exchanges the local variables, and then 
proceeds to examine the dependencies introduced by the probable owner variable and adjusts 
them accordingly. Then dependencies through the messages in the medium are traced, and 
normalized suitably.
In our current SPIN prototype implementing normalizations, the code in Figure 6 was man­
ually written. As this process is error-prone, we are in the process of developing a compiler that 
can take a high level description of the symmetries and automatically generate the normalizer 
code. For instance, the locking protocol would be described as shown in Figure 7.
In Figure 7, queues are represented as a list of processor-ids and the medium by “from:<ID>, 
to:<ID>, message<BODY>”. Notation [P /{el -> e l ’, e2 ->e2’, ...}] means every occurrence of el 
is replaced by e l ’ and every occurrence of e2 is replaced by e2’ in P (all replacements are done 
concurrently). If e l =  e2, then e l ’ and e2’ must end up being equal.
Given such a rewrite rule, the system creates a partial order function compare(ij) which 
returns '<’, “= ’, or “>’. If multiple rewrite rules are present, one compare function is generated
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function normalize (state)
{ for i  := 1 to number_of.processes do 
for j := i +1 to number.of.processes do
if  LESS-THAN(processor[i], processor[j]) then
— Exchange value ’i ’ with ’j ’
— F irst exchange the local variables, 
temp := local_variables (processor [i] );
local_variables(processor[i]) := local_variables(processor[j]); 
local_variables(processor[j]) := temp;
— Now adjust any dependencies throuh probable.owner
— or the queue.
for k := 1 to number.of.processors do
if  (processor[k].probable_owner==i) then 
processor[k].probable.owner := j; 
e ls if  (processor[k].probable_owner==j) then 
processor[k].probable.owner := i; 
end i f ;
foreach element (e in processor[k].Queue) do 
if  (e = i) then
replace e with j 
e ls if  (e = j) then 
replace e with i 
endif; 
end do e; 
end for k;
— Now check the medium state , 
foreach message (m in medium) do
if  (DesinationOf(m)== i) then 
DesinationOf(m) := j; 
e ls if  (DesinationOf(m) == j) then 
DesinationOf(m) := i; 
endif; 
end do m;
foreach message (m in medium) do 
if  (SourceOf(m)== i) then 
SourceOf(m) := j; 
e ls if  (SourceOf(m) == j) then 
SourceOf(m) := i; 
endif; 
end do m; 
end if ; — if  LESS-THAN 
end for j ; 
end for i;
}
Figure 6: The Normalizer
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{ (forall X
(Processor[X].po = P), (processor[X].Queue = Q))
(medium = H)
}
EQUALS — Exchange processor i with processor j
— for some arbitrary i ,  and j .
{
(Processor[X] .po = [P/{i->j, j-> i}]),
(Processor[X].Queue=[Q/{i->j, j-> i} ])»
(medium = M/{ from:i->from:j, from:j->from:i, 
to :i->  to : j ,  to :j->  to:i})
>
Figure 7: High-Level Description of Symmetries
per rule. Compare(ij) applies the rewrite rule, and then checks to see if the new vector is less 
than, equal, or greater than the original vector. If Compare(ij) returns “>’ then the original 
vector is considered to be in normal form. If Compare(i j )  returns the rewrite rule has no 
effect on the current state. If Compare(ij) returns “<’ then the rewrite rule is applied, and the 
new vector is considered to be in normal form.
This normalization is not confluent when more than one rewrite rule is present, in that two 
state vectors which are equivalent under the rewrite rules might not be reduced to the same 
normal form. However, when only one rewrite rule is present, the process is confluent. In 
general, finding the normal form for a state is known to be an NP-complete problem [2].
6  C o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  F u t u r e  W o r k
The results of Section 3 demonstrate that exploiting the symmetries can result in a significant 
improvement in the usage of available memory. It is therefore very important to exploit such 
symmetries to be able to verify large concurrent systems. This technique is more general than 
scalar sets [13] or network invariants [16]. While not as general as homomorphic reductions [15], 
it is simpler, and straightforward to apply. Also, Section 4 demonstrates that identifying the 
sequential regions of a protocol can result in significant savings in memory.
In Section 5 we presented a technique to translate high-level rewrite rules into a low-level 
normalization routine. This technique needs to be further investigated and implemented. It 
would also be useful to provide an automatic procedure to (1) identify the symmetries in a 
system and (2) check that the rewrite rules are consistent.
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